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PERMANENT FUND DIVIDEND:
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ABSTRACT
Alaska’s Permanent Fund Dividend (Dividend) is an annual payment to
eligible residents derived from state investment earnings on mineral royalties.
Since 1982, the Dividend has averaged a payout of approximately $1,000
annually. The Permanent Fund Dividend program allows a parent, guardian,
or other authorized representative to claim a Dividend on behalf of a child. Yet
Alaska law currently imposes no requirements whatsoever on how parents use
a child’s Dividend. This Note questions Alaska’s lack of parental duty when it
comes to managing children’s Dividends. Part I sketches the Permanent Fund
Dividend’s history and motivations, the mechanics of the program itself, and
the case law that has developed regarding parental duty under the program.
Part II then proposes that the way in which a child’s Dividend is characterized
influences what sort of parental duty (if any) attaches. In Part III, a
reinterpretation of the Dividend as income rightly belonging to the child is
offered as a compelling alternative to current doctrine. This Note concludes
that the lax treatment of a child’s Dividend under current Alaska law is
suspect, and argues that an income conception that imputes a higher degree of
parental duty better advances the program’s aims.

Copyright © 2017 by Eli Kozminsky.
*
J.D. Candidate, Duke University School of Law, 2017; A.B., Social Studies,
Harvard University, 2014. I want to thank Professor Thomas B. Metzloff for his
guidance and feedback in developing this Note; Professor Doriane Lambelet
Coleman, Professor Kathryn Webb Bradley, and Professor Sara Sternberg Greene
for their insights; and Sara Race (Permanent Dividend Fund Div. Dir.), Judge
Gregory J. Motyka, and Judge David R. Wallace for their cooperation and
assistance. I also want to thank the staff of the Alaska Law Review for their work in
preparing this Note for publication. Special thanks to Robert B. Groseclose and
Barbara L. Schuhmann for opening their home to a group of Duke Law students
and introducing us to Interior Alaska.

34.1 NOTE - KOZMINSKY (DO NOT DELETE)

86

ALASKA LAW REVIEW

5/1/2017 2:26 PM

Vol. 34:1

INTRODUCTION
Every year Alaskans “get money just for living.” 1 More specifically,
Alaska’s Permanent Fund Dividend (Dividend) is an annual payment to
eligible residents derived from state investment earnings on mineral
royalties. 2 Since its present-day inception in 1982, the Dividend has
averaged a payout of approximately $1,000 annually. 3 Without adjusting
for inflation, 2015 witnessed a new peak Dividend of $2,072. 4 That year
there were 672,741 valid applications for the Dividend, 5 aggregating to a
total disbursement of over $1.2 billion. 6 Of these valid applicants (and
ultimately recipients), 176,831 were children under the age of eighteen—
equaling 26.29% of 2015 recipients. 7 Translated into dollar terms, children
received over $360 million in Dividend payouts in 2015. 8 Not
surprisingly, the Permanent Fund Dividend program allows a parent,
guardian, or other authorized representative to claim a Dividend on
behalf of a child. 9
Yet Alaska law currently imposes no requirements whatsoever on
how parents use a child’s Dividend. 10 As of now, parents have no duty to
spend or invest these funds wisely or even ostensibly in the child’s
interest. Hypothetically, nothing prevents a parent from squandering a
child’s annual payout “on everything from alcohol to trips to Hawaii.” 11

1. DAVE ROSE, SAVING FOR THE FUTURE: MY LIFE AND THE ALASKA PERMANENT
FUND 157 (2008) (internal quotation marks omitted).
2. See About Us, ALASKA DEP’T OF REVENUE, PERMANENT FUND DIVIDEND DIV.,
https://pfd.alaska.gov/Division-Info/About-Us (last visited Apr. 23, 2016)
[hereinafter About Us].
3. See ALASKA DEP’T OF REVENUE, PERMANENT FUND DIVIDEND DIV., 2015
ANNUAL REPORT 37 (2015), https://perma.cc/VG5G-9QQ3 [hereinafter 2015
ANNUAL REPORT] (showing Dividends totaling $39,099.41 per person over a thirtyfour-year period, averaging roughly $1,149.98).
4. Chris Klint & Sean Doogan, $2,072: 2015 Alaska Permanent Fund dividend
amount
announced,
ALASKA
DISPATCH
NEWS,
Sept.
21,
2015,
https://www.adn.com/economy/article/2015-pfd-announcement-just-hoursaway-anchorage/2015/09/21/ (updated Sept. 28, 2016).
5. 2015 ANNUAL REPORT, supra note 3, at 37.
6. Id.
7. Id. at 24.
8. Id. at 24, 37. Each of the 176,831 valid children applicants received $2,072.
9. ALASKA STAT. § 43.23.005(c) (2015).
10. See infra note 66 and accompanying text.
11. Scott Goldsmith, The Alaska Permanent Fund Dividend: A Case Study in
Implementation of a Basic Income Guarantee 6 (July 2010) (unpublished
manuscript) (on file with the University of Alaska Anchorage Institute of Social
and Economic Research), http://www.iser.uaa.alaska.edu/Publications/bien_
xiii_ak_pfd_lessons.pdf.
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Hence, when it comes to parents claiming Dividends on behalf of
children, the program has been branded “ripe for abuse.” 12
This Note questions Alaska’s lack of parental duty when it comes to
managing children’s Dividends. Part I sketches the Permanent Fund
Dividend’s history and motivations, the mechanics of the program itself,
and the case law that has developed with respect to parental duty under
the program. Part II then proposes that the way in which a child’s
Dividend is characterized influences what sort of parental duty (if any)
attaches. Competing interpretations of the Dividend as a credit (as it is
treated now), welfare benefit, or child’s income are suggested in turn,
analyzing for various strengths, weaknesses, and ramifications of these
understandings. In Part III, the last of these characterizations—the
Dividend as income rightly belonging to the child—is offered as a
compelling alternative to current doctrine. This Note concludes that the
present treatment of a child’s Dividend, merely as a credit accompanied
by zero parental duty, is suspect, and argues that an income conception
that imputes a higher degree of parental duty better advances the
program’s aims.

I.
A.

ALASKA’S PERMANENT FUND DIVIDEND PROGRAM

History

The Permanent Fund Dividend was the product of a long-running
debate over the use of the Alaska Permanent Fund (APF). 13 The fund had
been incorporated into the Alaska Constitution in 1976, creating an
endowment derived from state mineral royalties that operates to this
day. 14 When the fund began, it was used as both an investment vehicle
and as a source of capital for large-scale development projects. 15 Skeptical
of concentrating this resource wealth in the government’s hands, though,
then-Governor Jay Hammond spearheaded legislation in 1980 to redirect
the APF from large-scale development projects into the hands of Alaska
residents in the form of a dividend from the fund. 16
Convinced that “the money could be used better by individuals than
spent on government programs or invested in development projects,” the

12. Donald B. Tobin, Investing in Our Children: A Not So Radical Proposal, 73 U.
CIN. L. REV. 457, 499 (2004).
13. Christopher L. Griffin, Jr., The Alaska Permanent Fund Dividend and
Membership in the State’s Political Community, 29 ALASKA L. REV. 79, 82 (2012) (citing
ROSE, supra note 1, at 185).
14. ALASKA CONST. art. IX, § 15.
15. Griffin, supra note 13, at 82.
16. Id. (citing ROSE, supra note 1, at 158).
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initial bill Governor Hammond guided through the legislature set the first
Dividend payment at fifty dollars to each citizen eighteen years of age or
older. 17 The bill also retroactively conferred on each adult one Dividend
per year of residency since 1959 (the year of Alaska statehood). 18 In 1982,
however, the United States Supreme Court in Zobel v. Williams 19 struck
down this “retrospective aspect” of the program.” 20 The aspect violated
the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment because it
unconstitutionally “favor[ed] established residents over new residents.” 21
Also, whereas the original program was available only to adults, 22 today
children are also eligible. 23
As Governor Hammond’s skepticism implied, one of the
motivations behind the Dividend’s enactment was an anti-paternalist
disposition in Alaska towards government spending. Not only would
APF returns be devolved from state projects to Alaska residents, this
money would come with no strings attached. Early supporters of the
Dividend argued that if the program’s objective was to provide benefits
for all Alaskans, “there was no better way than to give them cash so they
could decide for themselves what to spend it on rather than leaving that
decision to the government.” 24 However, this laissez-faire approach did
reportedly temper support for the program in the Alaska legislature,
where some feared recipients would spend much of the Dividend
unwisely. 25
Another related motivation behind the program was the desire to
enact a more hands-off substitute for state welfare programs. Again,

17. Id. (quoting ROSE, supra note 1, at 158–59).
18. Id.
19. 457 U.S. 55 (1982).
20. Id. at 65.
21. Id. (quoting Vlandis v. Kline, 412 U.S. 441, 450 (1973)).
22. Griffin, supra note 13, at 82.
23. ALASKA STAT. § 43.23.005(c). One explanation given for this change is that,
following Zobel, Alaskan lawmakers were concerned that excluding children
might also be unconstitutional. ROSE, supra note 1, at 166 (citing 2 TERRENCE COLE
& ELMER F. RASMUSON, BANKING ON ALASKA: THE STORY OF THE NATIONAL BANK OF
ALASKA 183–84 (2000)). But this argument is dubious. Age groups—including
minors—have generally not been considered suspect classes, meaning that state
classifications based on age are afforded deferential rational basis review. Mass.
Bd. of Retirement v. Murgia, 427 U.S. 307, 312 (1976); see also Nina A. Kohn,
Rethinking the Constitutionality of Age Discrimination: A Challenge to A Decades-Old
Consensus, 44 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 213, 215 (2010) (“For decades, both the legal
academy and the courts have assumed that—unlike classifications based on race
or gender—classifications based on age do not offend constitutional equal
protection guarantees. . . .”). A constitutional motive for including children in the
program would thus be unfounded.
24. Goldsmith, supra note 11, at 6.
25. Id.
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Governor Hammond, the Dividend’s founding father of sorts, believed
that APF returns were better spent by individuals than on government
programs. 26 Today, the Dividend continues to provide “an important
source of income for some Alaskans, particularly those in rural Alaska.” 27
This is moreover true for “cash-poor rural Alaskans,” for whom the
money supplies a yearly injection of liquidity. 28 The day following its
annual payout has even been referred to by some as “Early Christmas.” 29
A final impetus behind the Dividend program was the notion,
attributed to former Governor Wally Hickel, of Alaska as an “Owner
State.” 30 Because much of Alaska’s natural wealth is owned by the state
government, especially the land where the state’s oil and mineral wealth
is largely produced, the basic idea is that the residents who “own” or
control these resources have a corresponding obligation to develop those
resources for the benefit of all Alaskans. 31 In the same vein, no less than
the Alaska Constitution further mandates that the legislature utilizes,
develops, and conserves the state’s natural resources “for the maximum
benefit of its people.” 32
Consonant with this owner state ethic, then, when Governor
Hammond originally proposed the Dividend, it was in his view “a means
of ensuring that everyone benefitted from oil production on state-owned
lands.” 33 Thus, following the program’s enactment, the APF would be
managed as “an investment fund for the future,” with its income
distributed over the long term as dividends, rather than used as a
development bank to “force-feed” Alaska’s economy in the short term. 34
In this sense, the dual impulses of anti-paternalism and an owner state
26. See Griffin, supra note 17, and accompanying text.
27. ALASKA PERMANENT FUND CORP., AN ALASKAN’S GUIDE TO THE PERMANENT
FUND 26 (2009), http://www.apfc.org/home/Media/publications/2009Alaskans
Guide.pdf; see also ROSE, supra note 1, at 157 (“In rural Alaska, . . . the dividend
can make a major difference, providing an essential shot of cash to keep
subsistence hunters stocked with ammo and spare parts.”).
28. ROSE, supra note 1, at 166.
29. Ehren D. Lohse, Zobel’s Ghost: The Equity of Being an Alaskan Still Haunts
Permanent Fund Dividend Eligibility, 39 U. DAYTON L. REV. 447, 448 (2015) (citation
omitted).
30. Goldsmith, supra note 11, at 2; see also Wally Hickel, Alaska Has No Reason
to Roll Over for Outsiders, ALASKA DISPATCH NEWS: VOICES (Jan. 16, 2010),
https://www.adn.com/voices/article/alaska-has-no-reason-roll-overoutsiders/2010/01/17/ (referring to Alaska as “an owner state”).
31. Id.
32. ALASKA CONST. art. VIII, § 2.
33. Goldsmith, supra note 11, at 5 (footnote omitted). This mindset also
influenced the retrospective aspect of the original, unconstitutional Dividend
scheme: many lawmakers believed that “[t]hose who had lived in the state longer
had acquired a greater share of ownership.” ROSE, supra note 1, at 121.
34. ALASKA PERMANENT FUND CORP., supra note 27, at 7.
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ethic dovetailed with the Dividend itself: the program provided a way of
sharing the state’s communal natural wealth, without the threat of
governmental misappropriation of these funds or micromanagement
over their ultimate private use.
Out of these foundational and sometimes overlapping motivations
among Alaskan lawmakers and citizens—anti-paternalism, welfare
substitution, an owner state ethic—emerged the Dividend program as it
exists today. It is worth noting that, “[b]y nearly all accounts, the
[Dividend] has been a success and followed through on the constitutional
promise to use Alaska’s natural resources for the greater good . . . .” 35 The
next section examines the mechanics of how this program is currently
implemented, with special attention paid to the administration of
Dividends to child recipients.
B.

Mechanics

Funds for the Dividend are supplied by the APF described above. 36
The APF is in turn managed by the Alaska Permanent Fund Corporation,
a state-owned corporation. 37 Although capital for the APF is supplied by
mineral royalties, investments are allocated across a broad spectrum of
assets. 38 So while it is theoretically possible for the APF to have zero or
negative returns, and for a year’s Dividend to subsequently drop to zero,
the risk has thus far been spread sufficiently such that this has never
happened. 39 Indeed, in 1998 and 2015, fund earnings managed to outstrip
state oil revenue. 40
The Dividend program itself is administered by the Permanent Fund
Dividend Division within the Alaska Department of Revenue. 41
Individuals are eligible to receive a Dividend if they meet a series of
residency and application requirements. 42 The amount of each year’s
Dividend is derived from “a complex statutory formula but one that has

35. Griffin, supra note 13, at 83.
36. What is the Alaska Permanent Fund?, ALASKA PERMANENT FUND CORP.,
http://www.apfc.org/home/Content/aboutFund/aboutPermFund.cfm
(last
visited Feb. 3, 2017).
37. About the Alaska Permanent Fund Corporation (APFC), ALASKA PERMANENT
FUND CORP., http:/www.apfc.org/home/Content/aboutAPFC/aboutAPFC.cfm
(last visited Feb. 3, 2017).
38. See AN ALASKAN’S GUIDE TO THE PERMANENT FUND, supra note 27, at 16.
39. See 2015 ANNUAL REPORT, supra note 3, at 37 (documenting a historically
low Dividend of $331.29).
40. Klint & Doogan, supra note 4.
41. About Us, supra note 2; see also ALASKA STAT. § 43.23.055 (2015) (delegating
administration of the Dividend to the Department of Revenue).
42. ALASKA STAT. § 43.23.005(a).
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led to reasonably predictable annual payments . . . ,” 43 averaging roughly
$1,000, 44 although a Dividend is not per se guaranteed by the statutory
formula. 45 The Dividend is a flat amount for all recipients. 46
There are few restrictions on disbursement and use of Dividends. In
1992, 47 though, the legislature amended the statute to prohibit individuals
from assigning Dividends (except to government agencies). 48 Also, while
claims against an individual’s Dividend can be made directly to the
Permanent Fund Dividend Division, the statute (with some exceptions)
exempts 20% of recipients’ Dividends from debt collection. 49
On the other hand, the program works to facilitate certain uses of
Dividends. In 1991, the Permanent Fund Dividend Division implemented
a “check-off” program for advance college tuition savings, 50 whereby
Dividend recipients can opt to contribute up to 50% of their payouts to a
state-run savings trust with the University of Alaska. 51 Then, in 2009, the
Division started the “Pick.Click.Give.” program, where recipients can
similarly check-off if they want their Dividends to be contributed to
various Alaskan charities. 52 These initiatives have had a sizable impact on
rerouting disbursements: in 2015, Pick.Click.Give. distributed over $3
million among 538 eligible charitable institutions, while the University of
Alaska College Savings Plan saw Dividend contributions to the school’s
trust total over $14 million. 53
In 2015, more than one in four valid Dividend applicants was a child
under the age of eighteen. 54 Statute provides that a parent, guardian, or
other authorized representative may claim a Dividend “on behalf” of” an
unemancipated minor, provided other general eligibility requirements
are met. 55 Beyond this, the statute is silent on how a parent may use a

43. Griffin, supra note 13, at 82 (citing ALASKA STAT. § 43.23.025).
44. See 2015 ANNUAL REPORT, supra note 3, at 37.
45. See Griffin, supra note 13, at 82.
46. ALASKA STAT. § 43.23.025(a).
47. 2015 ANNUAL REPORT, supra note 3, at 32.
48. ALASKA STAT. § 43.23.069(a)–(b).
49. Id. § 43.23.065(a)–(b).
50. 2015 ANNUAL REPORT, supra note 3, at 32.
51. See ALASKA STAT. § 14.40.807(a)(1) (directing the Department of Revenue
to prepare the Dividend application to allow for contributions to the Alaska
Advance College Tuition Savings Fund); ALASKA STAT. § 14.40.802 (establishing
the Alaska Higher Education Savings Trust).
52. 2015 ANNUAL REPORT, supra note 3, at 28; see also ALASKA STAT. §
43.23.069(d) (authorizing the Department of Revenue to draw up a contribution
list of charities qualified by, among other things, majority Alaskan residency of
board members and in-state provision of services and aid).
53. 2015 ANNUAL REPORT, supra note 3, at 28–29.
54. Id. at 5.
55. ALASKA STAT. § 43.23.005(c).
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Dividend claimed on a child’s “behalf.” 56 Aside from verification
provisions to show custody and authority to apply on behalf of a child,
the regulations corresponding to this subsection are likewise silent
regarding a parent’s use of a child’s Dividend. 57 Outside of the statute,
the only express regulatory restriction on use of Dividends claimed on
behalf of a child is an extension of the statutory assignment ban described
above. 58
For children’s Dividends that are left unclaimed, however, there is a
further statutory provision and set of regulations. The legislature directed
the Department of Revenue to adopt regulations establishing procedures
for an individual upon emancipation or reaching the age of majority to
apply for Dividends left unclaimed during minority because a parent or
guardian did not apply on behalf of the individual. 59 Although not
advertised as any official program, the regulations allow qualifying
individuals to apply for unclaimed Dividends before they reach the age
of twenty. 60 In 2015, 49 applicants made use of these procedures, 61 while
in past years that number has reached as high as 767 in 2009 62 and 838 in
2010. 63
Otherwise, though, when it comes to dispensing Dividends, once a
child’s payout is claimed on his behalf by a parent or guardian, the
administering agency’s involvement is essentially finished. This handsoff stance is mirrored in the case law surrounding parental duty under
the Dividend program, the subject of the next section.
C.

Parental duty case law

Alaskan law does not provide for how a parent must or should use
a Dividend claimed on behalf of a child. 64 The state’s case law is no

56. See Hayes v. Hayes, 922 P.2d 896, 901 (Alaska 1996) (observing “the
legislature’s silence as to what parents must or should do with [Dividends]
received on behalf of unemancipated minors . . .”).
57. ALASKA ADMIN. CODE tit. 15, § 23.113 (2015).
58. Id. § 23.203(b).
59. ALASKA STAT. § 43.23.055(3).
60. ALASKA ADMIN. CODE tit. 15, § 23.133(c).
61. 2015 ANNUAL REPORT, supra note 3, at 10.
62. ALASKA DEP’T OF REVENUE, PERMANENT FUND DIVIDEND DIV., 2009 ANNUAL
REPORT 7 (2009), https://perma.cc/LAV2-GTCY.
63. ALASKA DEP’T OF REVENUE, PERMANENT FUND DIVIDEND DIV., 2010 ANNUAL
REPORT 7 (2010), https://perma.cc/4W6Y-LY3V [hereinafter 2010 ANNUAL
REPORT].
64. See Lohse, supra note 29, at 453 n.36 (“Alaska law does not provide for
how a parent should spend or save their child’s dividends.”); Tobin, supra note
12, at 478 (“Alaska law gives the parent tremendous leeway to use the child’s
dividend payment as the parent chooses.”).
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exception to this rule. At its core, this precedent reflects and incorporates
preexisting parental rights doctrine in Alaska. Among these rights of
parents over their children, this prior doctrine recognizes the right to
control a minor child’s earnings and property, notably including a child’s
Dividend money.
The earliest reported treatment of this issue by the Alaska Supreme
Court occurred in Lee v. Cox. 65 That 1990 case involved a child custody
and support dispute between Elizabeth Lee (the mother) and Geral Cox
(the father) following the dissolution of their marriage in 1984. 66 When
the mother informed the father that she planned to move with their son
Derek (the child) to Washington state, the father filed a Petition for
Change of Physical Custody and Support and for Clarification of Decree
of Dissolution. 67 After a hearing in 1988, the trial court changed the
physical custody of the child to the father, and further ordered the mother
to “reimburse [the child]’s permanent fund money by establishing a trust
account in an Alaskan bank . . . .” 68 When the mother failed to restore the
Dividends to an account for the child, she was found in contempt of court,
ordered to be incarcerated, and ultimately arrested. 69
On appeal, the supreme court held that the trial court abused its
discretion by ordering the mother to reimburse the child for all Dividends
claimed on his behalf. 70 “[T]here is no law in this state requiring parents
to set aside their children’s permanent funds.” 71 The father, who had
actually conceded this argument in his briefings, instead asserted that the
parties had agreed contractually to set aside the permanent fund
monies. 72 The court concluded by deeming the record insufficient to
support the trial court’s finding on this point, and so reversed and
remanded the lower court’s decision on this issue for further findings on
the father’s contract theory. 73
Lee went further than just articulating that Alaskan law imposes no
requirement that parents proactively set aside children’s Dividends. The
supreme court also incorporated preexisting doctrine on “parental rights”
into the Dividend context, 74 basing its decision on the pre-Dividend

65. 790 P.2d 1359 (Alaska 1990).
66. Id. at 1359–60.
67. Id. at 1360.
68. Id.
69. Id. at 1361.
70. Id. at 1363.
71. Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).
72. Id.
73. Id.
74. See id. (citing L.A.M. v. State, 547 P.2d 827, 832–33 n.13 (Alaska 1976)
(enumerating certain “parental rights”)); ALASKA STAT. § 43.23.005(c) (2015)
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delinquency case L.A.M. v. State. 75 While L.A.M. occurred prior to the
institution of the Permanent Fund Dividend, the precedent it set for
parental control over children would prove fundamental for later
Dividend doctrine.
In that case, L.A.M., a minor, appealed an order declaring her a
delinquent child for willful failure to comply with various court orders. 76
L.A.M. exhibited “a consistent pattern of running away,” which led to her
being legally declared a child in need of supervision, and was released to
her parents pending further adjudication. 77 When she absconded yet
again, L.A.M. was charged with criminal contempt, and the court directed
that the minor be institutionalized. 78
On appeal, L.A.M. argued that as a matter of Alaskan constitutional
law, a child in need of supervision may not be prosecuted for criminal
contempt. 79 She grounded her argument in Breese v. Smith, 80 where the
Alaska Supreme Court held that the right to liberty set out in the Alaska
State Constitution 81 guarantees every Alaskan regardless of age “total
personal immunity from governmental control: ‘the right to be let
alone’ . . .,” 82 qualified only to the extent that it “must yield when [it]
intrudes upon the freedom of others . . . .” 83 L.A.M. further bolstered her
argument by invoking the then recently-enacted “right to privacy.” 84
Since L.A.M.’s running away did not allegedly injure a specific definable
victim (including herself), she contended that the state lacked a
compelling interest to interfere with her conduct. 85
The Alaska Supreme Court rejected this argument. 86 Critically, in the
court’s view, L.A.M.’s reasoning erroneously assumed that the sole
interest to be protected is that of the child, whereas in truth the interests
of the parents (as well as those of the state) must also be taken into
account. 87 Proceedings against children alleged to be in need of
supervision, as in L.A.M., are “in substance and effect” custody disputes
in which the parent appeals to the court in order “to vindicate and enforce
(parent, guardian, or authorized representative may claim Dividend on behalf of
a minor).
75. 547 P.2d 827 (Alaska 1976).
76. Id. at 829.
77. Id.
78. Id. at 830.
79. Id. at 831.
80. 501 P.2d 159 (Alaska 1972).
81. ALASKA CONST. art. I, § 1.
82. Breese, 501 P.2d at 168 (internal quotation marks omitted).
83. Id. at 170 (internal quotation marks omitted).
84. L.A.M., 547 P.2d at 832 (citing ALASKA CONST., art. I, § 22).
85. Id.
86. Id.
87. Id.
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his custody rights in the child against that child.” 88 Among these so-called
“parental rights,” the court enumerated the right to “[p]hysical
possession of the child,” as well as “[t]he right to control and manage a
minor child’s earnings” and “control and manage a minor child’s
property.” 89 The court then indicated that such parental rights are
“protected to varying degrees by the [federal] Constitution . . . .” 90 But the
court left unsaid whether that implied the federal constitution trumped
the state constitutional provisions cited by L.A.M., or that the two
constitutions complemented each other (that is, it could be that Alaskan
rights to liberty and privacy facilitate federal parental rights). Either way,
in ignoring the interests and rights of parents over and against their
children, L.A.M. neglected to contest that her mother had a legally
enforceable right to her custody, and that the state could thus legitimately
enforce such an order. 91 Because L.A.M. failed to sustain or even raise this
claim, the court rejected L.A.M.’s constitutional argument. 92
L.A.M. did not deal directly with children’s Dividends, but the
Alaska Supreme Court would later import the case’s parental rights
doctrine into the Permanent Fund Dividend context. In Lee, the court
interpreted these rights as imposing no requirement that parents set aside
children’s Dividends. 93 Later, in Hayes v. Hayes, 94 the supreme court held
that the superior court did not err in rejecting Allan Hayes’ motion that
his former wife Lidia Hayes be required to repay $4,000 in dividend
monies she borrowed from their children’s Dividends. 95 Citing Lee’s
incorporation of L.A.M.’s parental right to control and manage a minor
child’s earnings and property, 96 Hayes went on to extend the permissive
holding in Lee. Not only is there no law obliging parents to proactively
“set aside” their children’s permanent funds, as enunciated in Lee: here
the “legislature’s silence as to what parents must or should do with
[Dividends] received on behalf of unemancipated minors” led the court
to even permit a parent siphoning money from a child’s Dividends. 97
Cases on this issue are few and far between, but their general trend has
been to impute no duty whatsoever to parents claiming Dividends on a
child’s behalf.
88. Id.
89. Id. at 832 n.13.
90. Id.
91. Id. at 833.
92. Id. at 834.
93. Lee v. Cox, 790 P.2d 1359, 1363 (Alaska 1990).
94. 922 P.2d 896 (Alaska 1996).
95. Id. at 901.
96. See id. at 900–01 (citing Lee, 790 P.2d at 1363 (citing L.A.M. v. State, 547
P.2d 827, 832–33 n.13)).
97. Hayes, 922 P.2d at 901.
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Perhaps because of the unforgiving clarity of this rule, there are no
Alaska cases reporting disputes between parents and their children (as
opposed to between feuding parents) regarding ownership of the
Dividend. 98 That being said, children would appear to have standing to
sue individuals for wrongly diverting their Dividends. In Chizmar v.
Mackie, 99 a mother sued her doctor on behalf of her minor children,
claiming the doctor’s malpractice was the proximate cause of the parents’
divorce. The children, through their mother, sought to recover Dividend
payments set aside by their parents that were allegedly lost as a result of
the divorce. 100 While the Alaska Supreme Court ultimately affirmed the
superior court’s ruling that economic losses suffered as a result of a
divorce are not recoverable, 101 it left unquestioned that the children had
standing to bring suit in the first place regarding the loss of their
Dividends. 102
As it stands today, though, based on a synthesis of statutory silence
and respect for parental rights, Alaskan case law does not dictate how a
parent may use a Dividend claimed on a child’s behalf. 103 Besides the
stark statutory text governing parental claims on behalf of children, the
associated Dividend regulations have generally proven immune to
litigation, as well. In State v. Anthony, 104 the state supreme court held that
a Dividend “is merely an economic interest and therefore is entitled only
to minimum protection under our equal protection analysis.” 105 Thus, the
lax administrative guidelines for parents claiming on children’s behalf
would receive a high degree of judicial deference were they to be
challenged, receiving minimal scrutiny in relation to their already sparse
authorizing statute.

98. Tobin, supra note 12, at 479 (citations omitted) (“There are no Alaska cases
reporting disputes between parents and children regarding ownership or
custodianship of the dividend.”).
99. 896 P.2d 196 (Alaska 1995).
100. Id. at 211 n.13.
101. Id. at 212.
102. Cf. id. at 211–12 (reaching and rejecting as a matter of law a claim for
recovery of economic loss resulting from divorce, including lost Dividends, only
“on proximate cause/foreseeability grounds and on more general public policy
grounds.”).
103. See, e.g., Lawson v. Reynolds, 2002 WL 1486484, at *9 nn.54–56 (Alaska
2002) (unpublished) (citing Hayes, 922 P.2d at 900–01; Lee v. Cox, 790 P.2d 1359,
1365 (Alaska 1990)); L.A.M. v. State, 547 P.2d 827, 832–33 n.13 (Alaska 1976)); see
also Tea ex rel. A.T., 278 P.3d 1262, 1263–64 (Alaska 2012) (interpreting
“[t]raditional parental rights” like the right to control and manage a minor child’s
property as extending to the Office of Child Services or a guardian ad litem
claiming a Dividend on behalf of a child deemed legally in need of aid).
104. 810 P.2d 155 (Alaska 1991).
105. Id. at 158.
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Yet while the current principle of zero parental duty under the
Dividend program may make sense in light of judicial precedent and
sparse statutory language, the following Part contends that this view
corresponds to a characterization of the Dividend as just a credit, and that
competing understandings of the Permanent Fund Dividend itself
suggest the need to rethink present doctrine.

II. CONCEPTUALIZING THE PERMANENT FUND DIVIDEND
Despite what its name would suggest (Permanent Fund Dividend),
the current approach outlined above treats children’s Dividends more as
something like a credit—simply a check in the mail 106—and
correspondingly imputes no duty to claimant parents. 107 But current law
supports other possible understandings of the Dividend program. There
are indications that it might instead be construed as a welfare-like benefit
or as income rightly belonging to the child. Accordingly, these competing
characterizations correlate with different and more demanding
imputations of parental duty.
It may help to picture these understandings of the Dividend as
forming a spectrum. At one end is a laissez-faire pole represented by
current doctrine, treating a child’s Dividend like a credit and imposing no
duty on parents. At the other end is a paternalistic pole, regarding the
Dividend as a type of welfare benefit, and imputing parental duty
analogous to something like the Social Security Act’s representative payee
system. Between these two extremes is a middle position, where the
Dividend is understood as the child’s rightful income, implicating some
form of a best interests standard when claiming such funds on the true
owner’s behalf. This spectrum of competing understandings of the
Dividend is analyzed below.
A.

Credit

Current doctrine treats a child’s Dividend as something like a credit,
imposing no conditions on the use of the funds once they are retained by
parents. 108 The analogy here is closest to a specific kind of credit: a tax
credit. Now, the Dividend is not literally a tax credit, which directly

106. See Goldsmith, supra note 11, at 20 (“Historically, the dividend was simply
distributed as a check in the mail with no suggestion to recipients about how they
might think about using it.”).
107. See Tobin, supra note 12, at 499 (describing the Dividend program as
imposing “almost no regulation or oversight” on dividend use, rendering it
“undistinguishable” from a tax credit in terms of supervision).
108. See id.
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reduces one’s tax liability. 109 But a credit like the federal Child Tax Credit,
for instance, lets taxpayer parents reduce taxable income per child. 110 So
in effect, “[t]he federal tax system delivers the equivalent of cash benefits
to families with children through . . . the Child Tax Credit.” 111 Yet this
cash comes with no condition that a cent of the restored money actually
goes to the child’s benefit. 112 Conceptually, then, Alaska distributes
money to parents in a hands-off way “undistinguishable” from a typical
tax credit program. 113
At first blush, this might seem like a sound understanding of the
program. It jibes with the relatively sparse language of the statute
permitting parents to claim Dividends on children’s behalf. 114 It also
mirrors Alaska’s judicial embrace of parental rights in the Dividend
context 115 and the parallel anti-paternalistic political culture that
influenced the program’s enactment. 116 Viewing the Dividend as simply
a credit entails less meddling by the government in parents’ rightful
domain.
This understanding also reflects a general rule that if a family is
intact, a court will not interfere with its affairs. The points of judicial
scrutiny are usually limited to marriage, divorce, and abuse or neglect—
otherwise the presumption is to leave the family alone. 117 Hence, the only
time Alaskan courts have been willing to actively apportion a child’s
Dividend with a view to the child’s best interests is when this power is
triggered by an event such as divorce. 118 As in the usual case of child
109. RICHARD SCHMALBECK ET AL., FEDERAL INCOME TAXATION 18 (4th ed. 2015).
110. Tobin, supra note 12, at 481.
111. Id. at 480.
112. See id. at 489.
113. Id. at 499.
114. See Hayes v. Hayes, 922 P.2d 896, 901 (Alaska 1996) (observing “the
legislature’s silence as to what parents must or should do with [Dividends]
received on behalf of unemancipated minors . . .”).
115. Lee v. Cox, 790 P.2d 1359 (Alaska 1990); L.A.M. v. State, 547 P.2d 827, 832
n.13 (Alaska 1976) (enumerating certain “parental rights”).
116. See discussion supra Part I.A.
117. Cf. Mary Becker, Maternal Feelings: Myth, Taboo, and Child Custody, 1 S.
CAL. REV. L. & WOMEN’S STUD. 133, 205 (1992) (“While a marriage is intact, neither
of the parents, nor anyone else, can find a judge willing to interfere because of an
argument based on the best interest of children unless the child is neglected or
abused in a serious way. . . . [A]t divorce all notions of limitations on government
intrusion in family matters evaporate.”).
118. See, e.g., Helen S.K. v. Samuel M.K., 288 P.3d 463, 477 (Alaska 2012)
(holding the superior court did not abuse its discretion in a divorce proceeding
when it assigned the father the right to apply for and manage his children’s
Dividends); Ronny M. v. Nanette H., 303 P.3d 392, 407–08 (Alaska 2013) (citing
Helen S.K. 288 P.3d 463 at 477) (recognizing in a custody dispute “the superior
court’s broad discretion to decide which parent would better serve the children’s
best interests in being responsible for management of their [Dividends].”).
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support, however, there is no indication of ongoing monitoring after such
apportionment once the monies are received. 119 The best interests inquiry
in these few cases is not specific to the Dividend program; rather it relies
on the same general discretionary factors typically used for child custody
determinations. 120 And this discretion cuts both ways: the statutory
silence regarding parental duty can actually give courts more leeway in
declining to order parents to use Dividends in a certain manner, as a
hands-off determination is consistent with current laissez-faire
precedent. 121
In terms of actual use by parents of their children’s Dividends, or by
Dividend recipients generally, survey data are virtually nonexistent. 122 At
least anecdotally, some Alaskans save the money for education or use it
to pay off debts or medical bills. 123 Others, meanwhile, “blow the
windfall” on luxury goods like “vacations or expensive toys.” 124
However, one of the more rigorous studies (albeit from 1984) reported
that money from children’s Dividends claimed by parents went
predominantly to debt repayment. 125 While it may seem doubtful that
these children were themselves indebted, there is great practical difficulty
in trying to disaggregate from household debt what exactly was spent
“on” children, especially if this category were to include normal credit
card purchases and repayments. 126
Lastly, Alaskan courts have repeatedly decided that Dividends are
“not, generally, a source of income that individuals depend on to supply
the basic necessities of life.” 127 So while Dividends may be a welcomed
source of income to many Alaskans, they are not normally a life-or-death

119. See Robert H. Mnookin & Lewis Kornhausert, Bargaining in the Shadow of
the Law: The Case of Divorce, 88 YALE L.J. 950, 960 (1979) (“A custodial spouse is not
required to keep track of how child-support money is spent, and the courts do not
supervise child-support expenditures once a payment has been made.”).
120. See Helen S.K., 288 P.3d at 472–73, 477 (citing ALASKA STAT. § 25.24.150(c)
(2015)) (describing typical standard of review for child custody disputes).
121. See Ronny M., 303 P.3d at 407–08 (citing Hayes v. Hayes, 922 P.2d 896, 900–
01 (Alaska 1996)) (declining to order children’s Dividends be apportioned to
visitation expenses).
122. Goldsmith, supra note 11, at 9 (noting how there have been “very few
studies on the effects of the dividend.”).
123. ROSE, supra note 1, at 157.
124. Id.
125. GUNNAR KNAPP ET AL., THE ALASKA PERMANENT FUND DIVIDEND PROGRAM:
ECONOMIC EFFECTS AND PUBLIC ATTITUDES 95, 101–02 (1984), http://www.iser.uaa.
alaska.edu/ Publications/1984_09-AlaskaPermanentFundDividendProgram.pdf.
126. See Mnookin & Kornhausert, supra note 123, at 960–61 (discussing the
problems of disaggregating “joint consumption” among family members).
127. E.g., State v. Anthony, 810 P.2d 155, 158 (Alaska 1991) (citing Williams v.
Zobel, 619 P.2d 448, 455 (Alaska 1980)).
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matter. Lax treatment of how a parent may use such an inessential credit
would thus seem reasonable.
Understandable as this approach may be, though, it quickly
encounters a common sense criticism: What good is the program to
society’s vulnerable children if, hypothetically, parents are allowed to
squander a child’s Dividend on vices or vacations? 128 With this possibility
left wide open under the current law, the program strikes one as “ripe for
abuse,” 129 just as some legislators feared at its enactment. 130 Put
differently, the anti-paternalistic rationale for the Dividend seem at odds
with the owner state ethic 131 and Alaska’s “constitutional promise to use
[its] natural resources for the greater good . . . .” 132 The program’s
conflicting motivations and implementation render it self-undermining.
Luckily, as argued later, the statute and program itself support viewing
children’s Dividends as more than just a credit requiring no responsibility
from claimant parents.
B.

Welfare benefit

At the opposite extreme of the spectrum sketched above, construing
the Dividend as something like a state welfare benefit sheds light on the
shortcomings of the present zero-duty treatment. If treated as a
government welfare program, then it might make sense to require parent
claimants to conform to some minimum fiduciary standard. For instance,
the Social Security Act (SSA) provides for a “representative payee” to
control a child recipient’s social security check and use that money for the
child’s benefit. 133 The statute defines “misuse of benefits” by a
representative payee to occur “in any case in which the representative
payee” receives payment under the program and puts it “to a use other
than for the use and benefit of such other person.” 134 Representative
payee responsibilities include “[using] the benefits received on [the
child’s] behalf only for [the child’s] use and benefit in a manner and for
the purposes he or she determines under the[se] . . . to be in [in the child’s]
best interests.” 135 The Social Security Administration’s Office of the
Inspector General may impose civil monetary penalties and assessments
against representative payees who convert payments to their own

128.
129.
130.
131.
132.
133.
134.
135.

Goldsmith, supra note 11, at 6.
Tobin, supra note 12, at 499.
Goldsmith, supra note 11, at 6.
Id.
Griffin, supra note 13, at 83.
42 U.S.C. § 1383(a) (2016); 20 C.F.R. § 416.635(a) (2006).
42 U.S.C. § 1383(a)(2)(A)(iv).
20 C.F.R. § 416.635(a).
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personal use. 136 Also, with few exceptions, Social Security benefits are
exempt from garnishment by creditors, 137 and banks are required to
automatically protect two months’ worth of benefits if they are directdeposited into an account. 138
Yet it seems unlikely that something as demanding as the
representative payee requirements could be inferred from the Dividend’s
underlying statute. Perhaps the most favorable argument on this score is
that the relevant statutory language is ambiguous, simply permitting a
qualified parent to claim a Dividend “on behalf of” an eligible child. 139 By
itself, the phrase “on behalf of” could admit of several different meanings.
Alaskan courts have interpreted this to connote the right to control and
manage a minor child’s earnings and property, at least in the Dividend
context. 140 Black’s Law Dictionary, meanwhile, takes “on behalf of” to
mean “in the name of, on the part of, as the agent or representative of.” 141
The last of these appears to be the sense in which the above SSA
regulations use the term, as well. 142 In weighing these competing
definitions, Alaskan courts “do not mechanically apply the plain meaning
rule but use a sliding scale approach to statutory interpretation, in which
‘the plainer the statutory language is, the more convincing the evidence
of contrary legislative purpose or intent must be.’” 143 This holds true
“even if a statute is facially unambiguous.” 144 If the current judicial
understanding of the term frustrates the Dividend program’s purpose, as
suggested earlier, 145 then this “sliding scale approach” may favor the
dictionary definition of “on behalf” of,” wherein parents are agents of their
children when entrusted with the responsibility of claiming Dividends.

136. 42 U.S.C. § 1320a–8(a)(3).
137. 42 U.S.C. § 407(a).
138. CONSUMER FIN. PROT. BUREAU, Ask CFPB: Can a Debt Collector Take My
Social Security or VA Benefits?, http://www.consumerfinance.gov/askcfpb/1157/
can-creditor-garnish-my-social-security-benefits-pay-debt.html (last visited Feb.
3, 2017).
139. ALASKA STAT. § 43.23.005(c) (2015).
140. L.A.M. v. State, 547 P.2d 827, 832 n.13 (Alaska 1976).
141. Behalf, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (10th ed. 2014) (emphasis added).
142. 20 C.F.R. § 416.635 (emphasis added) (“A representative payee has a
responsibility to . . . [u]se the benefits received on your behalf only for your use and
benefit in a manner and for the purposes he or she determines under the[se]
guidelines . . . to be in your best interests . . .”).
143. Municipality of Anchorage v. Stenseth, 361 P.3d 898, 905 (Alaska 2015)
(quoting McDonnell v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 299 P.3d 715, 721 (Alaska
2013)).
144. Dep’t of Commerce, Cmty. & Econ. Dev., Div. of Ins. v. Alyeska Pipeline
Serv. Co., 262 P.3d 593, 597 (Alaska 2011).
145. See discussion supra Part II.A.
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This ambiguity casts some serious doubts on current doctrine. 146
Nevertheless, the statute’s vague language seems lenient relative to the
direct mandates of the SSA, which expressly define proper and abusive
use of benefits. 147 But a more fundamental problem with this
interpretation has to do with the Dividend’s various “check-off”
initiatives. The statute itself permits parents to not only divert up to half
of a child’s Dividend into the state-run savings trust (deferring, though
not forfeiting, the benefits), but also to immediately donate a child’s entire
Dividend to a qualified charity. 148 In other words, the statute implicitly
allows parents to forfeit their child’s whole dividend so long as it goes
back into the community. Consistent with neighboring sections, then, the
statutory standard would be much weaker than the SSA’s. At most, it
might be inferred that parental use of Dividends must return to the
community in some form, the assumption perhaps being that this way
everyone—including the recipient child—thereby benefits from a sort of
diffused communal payback.
Several other factors weigh against characterizing the Dividend as a
state welfare program with SSA-like protections. First, it is not unusual
for welfare programs to lack such fiduciary safeguards. For instance, the
Earned Income Credit (EIC), one of the country’s largest anti-poverty
programs, 149 is intended to provide the equivalent of cash assistance to
working people with low incomes, providing the greatest benefit to
working families with children. 150 Yet the EIC places no requirement that
the recipient spend the money on his or her child. 151 So even if the
Dividend were construed as a welfare benefit, it would be possible to
define it as a no-strings-attached credit like the EIC.
Lastly, notwithstanding one of the Dividend’s original motivations,
it does not function purely like a substitute for welfare programs. Again,
Alaskan courts have recognized that the Dividend is not typically a source
of income that recipients depend on for basic necessities, 152 and have
146. See Tobin, supra note 12, at 478 (“Concluding that a parent has ‘“the right
to control and manage” a minor child’s earnings and property’ is not the same as
holding that the parent may use the child’s money for the parent’s own benefit. It
may be that the parent has control over the money but still has some duty to
ensure that the child receives the benefit of the dividend.”).
147. See 42 U.S.C. § 1383(a)(2)(A)(iv) (2016).
148. ALASKA STAT. § 14.40.807(a)(1) (establishing the Alaska Advance College
Tuition Savings Fund); id. § 14.40.802 (establishing the Alaska Higher Education
Savings Trust); id. § 43.23.069(d) (establishing charitable giving program and
parameters).
149. SCHMALBECK ET AL., supra note 109, at 771.
150. Tobin, supra note 12, at 488.
151. Id. at 489.
152. State v. Anthony, 810 P.2d 155, 158 (Alaska 1991) (citing Williams v.
Zobel, 619 P.2d 448, 455 (Alaska 1980)).
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adjudged that “recipients cannot know with certainty how much it will
be in any given year.” 153 Further, it remains possible—if unprecedented—
for a year’s Dividend calculation to come out to zero.
While a strict welfare benefit conception of the Dividend does not
get too far, it at least helps underscore how the current treatment of the
Dividend is left wanting. And, at least indirectly, it charts the way for how
a more adequate understanding of the Dividend might navigate between
these two extreme conceptions. This middle path—rethinking the
Dividend as a child’s rightful income—is the subject of the following
section.
C.

Child’s income

The Dividend can convincingly be understood as a recipient child’s
rightful income. Beginning outside the program itself, the Internal
Revenue Service (IRS) treats children’s Dividend as taxable income to the
child. 154 That Dividends are treated as normal above-the-line income is not
unexpected, given the broad Internal Revenue Code definition of gross
income 155 and taxability of other government stipends. 156 Nor is it
surprising to attribute Dividend income to children, since it is the child’s
name that appears on the annual check. 157 Consistent with this
understanding, Alaskan courts have excluded a child’s Dividend from a
custodial parent’s income when calculating that income for purposes of
child support and alimony. 158 More intriguing, though, is that such
attribution of income typically corresponds to who has control over that
income, rather than who ultimately benefits from it. 159 To identify
Dividend income as belonging to the child would seem to imply that
some right of control over these funds resides with the child. In this

153. Id.
154. See INTERNAL REVENUE SERV., DEP’T OF TREASURY, Pub. 3328, Cat. No.
26988N, HOW TO FILE YOUR CHILD’S 2002 TAX RETURN: INFORMATION FOR PARENTS
OF ALASKAN CHILDREN 1 (2002), https://www.irs.gov/pub/irs-pdf/p3328.pdf
(explaining IRS treatment of children’s Dividends).
155. 26 U.S.C. § 61(a) (2012) (emphasis added) (“[G]ross income means all
income from whatever source derived”).
156. See, e.g., INTERNAL REVENUE SERV., DEP’T OF TREASURY, Cat. No. 11320B,
FORM 1040: U.S. INDIVIDUAL INCOME TAX RETURN 1 (2015) (including Social Security
benefits in gross income).
157. E-mail from Sara Race, Permanent Dividend Fund Div. Dir., to author
(Feb. 18, 2016, 3:33 PM EST) (on file with author).
158. Fernau v. Rowdon, 42 P.3d 1047, 1052 (Alaska 2002).
159. See, e.g., Lucas v. Earl, 281 U.S. 111, 114–15 (1930) (attributing taxable
income to husband even though he had contracted out his earnings to his wife);
Helvering v. Horst, 311 U.S. 112, 116–17 (1940) (attributing taxable income to
bondholder even though he assigned interest coupons to his child).
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regard, the IRS and Alaskan child support and alimony case law appear
out of sync with current doctrine’s unqualified recognition of absolute
parental control.
The Dividend’s underlying statute also implies that the Dividend is
a child’s rightful income. While the statute authorizes parents to claim
Dividends “on behalf” of” a child, 160 generally no one is permitted to
assign away a Dividend. 161 Further, while a recipient may donate her
entire Dividend to a charitable organization, it must be a qualified
Alaskan charity. 162 The statute thus seems to imply some concern, or at
least discomfort, with outright forfeiture of Dividends.
Recall too how the program provides that an individual upon
reaching majority, or who is an emancipated minor, may apply for
unclaimed Dividends until the age of twenty. 163 In fact, the legislature
provided only this exception to the program’s strict filing deadlines. 164
Note that these unclaimed Dividends can only be claimed by their
designated recipient upon reaching majority or emancipation, and
parents may not claim these Dividends on that recipient’s behalf. 165
Although not advertised as an official program like the College Savings
Plan, these unclaimed dividends are reserved by the Alaska Department
of Revenue until the applicant is eligible to file for them, with the
Permanent Fund Dividend Division reporting that over half a million
dollars was set aside in anticipation of such filers in 2015. 166 In theory,
then, one might assume a year with as many unclaimed Dividend
claimants as 2010 (838 applicants) 167 and a historically average Dividend
(about $1,000), 168 and where all these recipients wait until the last minute
to file (just shy of age 20). All else equal, a back-of-the-envelope
calculation shows that applicants would receive $20,000 each, with an
aggregate windfall exceeding $16 million.
160. ALASKA STAT. § 43.23.005(c) (2015).
161. Id. § 43.23.069(b) (permitting assignments only to a court or government
agency).
162. Id. § 43.23.069.
163. Id. § 43.23.055(3); ALASKA ADMIN. CODE tit. 15, § 23.133(c) (2016).
164. In the Matter of Annmarie Rega Jones, Revenue Decision 88-39 (Alaska
Dep’t Rev. 1988).
165. In the Matter of Mr. and Mrs. Applicant, Revenue Decision 89-032 (Alaska
Dep’t Rev. 1989) (“[B]ecause of the late filing, the Father and Mother are denied
Dividends for 1985 and the Children will not be eligible to claim their 1985
Dividends until they are emancipated or reach the age of 18.”).
166. 2015 ANNUAL REPORT, supra note 3, at 36. Unclaimed Dividends do not
accrue interest while they are held by the Department of Revenue. E-mail from
Sara Race, Permanent Dividend Fund Div. Dir., to author (Feb. 26, 2016, 8:57 PM
EST) (on file with author).
167. 2010 ANNUAL REPORT, supra note 63, at 5.
168. See 2015 ANNUAL REPORT, supra note 3, at 37.
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The unclaimed Dividends provision of the program thus appears to
be a narrow but important exception for child recipients when their funds
go unclaimed. It would further seem to imply that between birth and age
of majority, Dividends are still understood as belonging to the child, since
otherwise the state reserves these funds in the child’s stead until she
reaches a responsible age. This would be a plausible explanation for
drawing the line for unclaimed Dividends at the age of majority rather
than allowing children to reclaim them in the interim. This rationale could
also entail that parents are some sort of fiduciaries during this interim, if
children themselves are only allowed to reclaim their Dividends when
they attain an age associated with responsibility.
Alaska courts “interpret each part or section of a statute with every
other part or section, so as to create a harmonious whole.” 169 Here, then,
the sparse and arguably permissive language allowing parents to claim
Dividends “on behalf” of” children would be moderated by the statute’s
concurrent discomfort with outright forfeiture and implicit recognition
that children’s Dividends belong to them all along. Rather than being free
to waste children’s Dividends, parents would need to operate under the
standard that such money be treated as the child’s income. Reconciling
these tandem statutory provisions gives even greater credence to an
understanding of parents who claim Dividends “on behalf” of” children
as truly the latter’s agent rather than substitute. 170
Another unresolved corner of this issue of Dividend ownership
versus control involves debtor parents who handle their children’s
payouts. Upon disbursement from the Department of Revenue, the
Dividend program allows immediate garnishment of up to 80% of a
Dividend for debt collection purposes, with no limits on garnishment
following an applicant’s later receipt of his Dividend. 171 The state’s
majority rule is that any bank account can be executed on so long as the
debtor has the ability to withdraw money from that account, unless a
debtor files a claim of exemption based on a list of nonexclusive factors. 172
This extends even to joint accounts in the name of the parent and child

169. Estate of Kim ex rel. Alexander v. Coxe, 295 P.3d 380, 386 (Alaska 2013)
(citing Dep’t of Commerce, Cmty. & Econ. Dev., Div. of Ins. v. Progressive Cas.
Ins. Co., 165 P.3d 624, 629 (Alaska 2007)).
170. See Behalf, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (10th ed. 2014) (suggesting that the
word “behalf” implies an agency relationship).
171. ALASKA STAT. § 43.23.065 (2015).
172. Telephone Interview with Judge Gregory J. Motyka, Dist. Ct. Judge, 3d
Jud. Dist., Anchorage, & Judge David R. Wallace, Dist. Ct. Judge, 3d Jud. Dist.,
Anchorage (Mar. 1, 2016) [hereinafter Interview with Judge Motyka & Judge
Wallace]. See generally ALASKA CT. SYSTEM, JUDGMENT DEBTOR BOOKLET (2012)
(describing Alaska’s debt collection procedures and exemptions).
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where a parent might deposit Dividends claimed on a child’s behalf (since
the minor cannot otherwise open such an account). 173
Yet within Alaska state district courts, a minority line of cases has
cropped up in which children’s Dividends claimed by parents are not
legally considered income of the debtor parent, but rather that of the
child, thereby exempting such Dividends from execution. 174 In this view,
the only option the majority rule gives debtor parents trying to protect
their child’s Dividend is to stuff the money under a mattress, as the child
cannot otherwise open an individual account. 175 By instead determining
that the money rightly belongs to the child, judges can more equitably
exempt the child’s Dividend from execution against a debtor parent,
despite the parent actually controlling the money. But while this issue
arises in many cases each year, with potentially thousands of dollars at
stake in each case, the inconsistent approaches taken by district courts
throughout Alaska (which itself seems unfair) has apparently never been
appealed: creditors whose debt collection is denied likely do not want to
risk creating unfavorable precedent, while debtors not granted this
exemption likely cannot afford an appeal. 176
Taken together, the implication of control through tax attribution of
Dividend income, the interplay of the Dividend’s statutory provisions,
and Alaska’s developing judicial approach to children’s Dividends in the
debt context—all these provide strong indicators that a child’s Dividend,
even if claimed by a parent on a child’s behalf, should be understood as
the child’s own income. 177 This interpretation likely imputes some higher
degree of duty to claimant parents, above current laissez-faire standards.
If so, this rethinking of children’s Dividends could have major
implications for the judicial, legislative, and administrative
implementation of the Dividend program. The final Part explores some of
these ramifications of an income conception of children’s Dividends, and
argues that such treatment better advances the program’s aims.

III. RETHINKING THE DIVIDEND AS CHILDREN’S INCOME
The Dividend can persuasively be understood as income rightly
belonging to the recipient child. Consequently, in executing the program,
some higher degree of responsibility should be expected from parents
173. Interview with Judge Motyka & Judge Wallace, supra note 172.
174. Id. Unfortunately, because these are state district court opinions, they
have gone unpublished and unreported. Id.
175. Id.
176. Id.
177. See Tobin, supra note 12, at 478 (noting that “the dividend clearly belongs
to the child”).
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claiming Dividends on behalf of children. Rethinking the program in this
way would entail a variety of potential legal and policy responses. As this
Part concludes, an income conception of a child’s Dividend thus presents
a compelling alternative to present doctrine.
Judicially, this conception of children’s Dividends is likely sufficient
to implicate a constructive trust under Alaska law, at least in cases where
a parent claiming a Dividend on a child’s behalf squanders the payout. A
constructive trust is an equitable remedy that becomes available upon
clear and convincing proof that a party holds a property interest “by
reason of unjust, unconscionable, or unlawful means.” 178 In imposing a
constructive trust, a court returns the ill-begotten property interest to the
wronged party. 179 “At a minimum, then, a constructive trust presupposes
a transfer or holding of property in which the equitable beneficiary has a
legal interest and unconscionable conduct by the property’s holder in
connection with its acquisition.” 180
Children already appear to have standing to sue individuals for
wrongly diverting their Dividends, even if that latter argument has so far
found no purchase. 181 In a constructive trust situation, then, the child may
have a cognizable legal interest in her Dividend based on the indicators
considered above. If a parent claimant used the money in some
unconscionable way too remote from the child’s interests (like gambling
or drinking), a court could impose a constructive trust to remedially vest
the misused Dividend back with the rightful child beneficiary.
The resultant standard or duty of conscionable use would likely not
be too strict, though. A constructive trust is not tantamount to a fullfledged fiduciary relationship, 182 like the one found in the SSA
representative payee program. And a dollar-for-dollar trace of how
178. Gold Dust Mines, Inc. v. Little Squaw Gold Min. Co., 299 P.3d 148, 160
(Alaska 2012) (internal citations and quotations omitted).
179. Id. (citing McKnight v. Rice, Hoppner, Brown & Brunner, 678 P.2d 1330,
1335 (Alaska 1984)).
180. Riddell v. Edwards, 76 P.3d 847, 852 (Alaska 2003).
181. Cf. Chizmar v. Mackie, 896 P.2d 196, 211–12 (Alaska 1995) (reaching and
rejecting as a matter of law a claim for recovery of economic loss resulting from
divorce, including lost Dividends, only “on proximate cause/foreseeability
grounds and on more general public policy grounds.”’).
182. Under Alaskan law, a “confidential or fiduciary relationship exists when
one imposes a special confidence in another, so that the latter, in equity and good
conscience, is bound to act in good faith and with due regard to the interests of
the one imposing the confidence.” Paskvan v. Mesich, 455 P.2d 229, 232 (Alaska
1969). However, “[a] constructive trust, unlike an express trust, is not a fiduciary
relation, although the circumstances which give rise to a constructive trust may
or may not involve a fiduciary relation.” RESTATEMENT (FIRST) OF RESTITUTION § 160
cmt. a (AM. LAW. INST. 1937). “A constructive trust does not, like an express trust,
arise because of a manifestation of an intention to create it, but it is imposed as a
remedy to prevent unjust enrichment.” Id.; see also McKnight, 678 P.2d at 1335.
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children’s Dividends are used is probably impractical, 183 not to mention
politically unpalatable. 184 Further, a remaining issue is that the “checkoff” Pick.Click.Give. initiative already sanctions a parent immediately
donating away a child’s entire Dividend to Alaskan charities. 185 So
potentially there is at least one authorized way for parents to spend a
Dividend such that the child receives little to no direct benefit. Maybe this
implies some permissible range of uses, spanning from harmless private
use to communal reinvestment. Alternatively, courts might infer a rule
prohibiting constructive-trustee parents from donating away a child’s
entire Dividend. It could be that, in light of the program’s purpose and
structure, courts need to begin charting a zone of responsible—or at least
unobjectionable—uses for children’s rightful Dividends.
Legislatively, lawmakers could endorse this conception of children’s
Dividends by amending the existing statute. The legislature could clarify
that the “on behalf of” language in fact entails a principal-agent
relationship between the child and parent regarding the child’s rightful
money. 186 Likewise, lawmakers could enact a similar standard of
permissible use for parental claimants, analogous to the SSA
representative payee provision. 187
Administratively, pursuant to the indeterminate statutory language,
the Department of Revenue could implement noninvasive measures to
“nudge” parents into making choices more consonant with using the
child’s rightful income in her best interest. 188 For example, the state might
establish a public trust account to save children’s Dividends for the
future, similar to those in effect now for governmental agencies and the
University of Alaska College Savings Plan. 189 This could be presented as
a “check-off” option to parents claiming Dividends on behalf of children,
or even be made a default selection that parents would need to opt out
of. 190 Taking a different route, the Division might also impose firmer
183. See Mnookin & Kornhausert, supra note 119, at 960.
184. See discussion supra Part I.A.
185. See ALASKA STAT. § 43.23.069(d) (establishing charitable giving program
and parameters).
186. See Behalf, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (10th ed. 2014) (suggesting that the
word “behalf” implies an agency relationship).
187. Cf. 42 U.S.C. § 1383(a)(2)(A)(iv) (2016) (defining “misuse of benefits” to
encompass “a use other than for the use and benefit” of the payee).
188. See generally RICHARD H. THALER & CASS R. SUNSTEIN, NUDGE: IMPROVING
DECISIONS ABOUT HEALTH, WEALTH, AND HAPPINESS 1–14 (2008) (describing how
decisions are influenced by the way in which choices are presented).
189. See ALASKA STAT. § 43.23.015(e) (2015); ALASKA ADMIN. CODE tit. 15, §
23.223(g) (2015); ALASKA STAT. § 14.40.802; id § 14.40.807(a)(1).
190. See Goldsmith, supra note 11, at 20 (proposing new “framing” of dividend
application that presents the option of “a savings account for minor children that
they would gain control of upon reaching 18 years of age.”).
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authorization requirements for parents claiming on behalf of children,
requiring claimants to demonstrate not merely custody, 191 but also
concern for the personal welfare of the beneficiary. 192 Fortunately, then,
while the presently lax doctrine regarding children’s Dividends has its
problems, a host of possible solutions avail themselves once the Dividend
is reconceived as a child’s rightful income.
Understanding the Dividend in this way, and pursuing its legal and
policy implications, overcomes the inadequacies of the present approach.
Implementing any of these safeguards for a child’s income would serve
to check the current potential for abuse by parents claiming on behalf of
their children. Consistent with Alaska’s owner state ethic, such
protections would also ensure that the communal natural resource wealth
embodied by the Dividend is developed and disbursed to the benefit of
all Alaskans, rather than irresponsibly diverted by claimant parents.
Further, many of the above limitations on parental use are relatively less
invasive when compared to more demanding analogues like Social
Security. They would thus represent a respectful compromise between
the state’s anti-paternalistic political culture and the Dividend program’s
other goals.
Lastly, treating children’s Dividends as their rightful income would
bolster the welfare-substitution function played by the program. The
heightened level of responsibility this approach imputes to parents would
help guarantee that Dividends actually benefit children as a substitute for
more traditional state benefits. In contrast with the current selfundermining approach, then, an income conception of children’s
Dividends and the responses it entails would better effectuate the
objectives of the Permanent Fund Dividend itself.

CONCLUSION
This Note has sought to critique the current understanding of the
Dividend program, and cast doubt on the doctrine imputing zero duty to
parents claiming Dividends on behalf of children. The present
characterization and legal treatment of children’s Dividends is not the
only reasonable way of approaching the program; a reinterpretation of
Dividends as children’s rightful income is compelling in light of the
history, purpose, and structure of the Permanent Fund Dividend, and
invites a variety of potential legal and policy responses. Moreover, this

191. ALASKA ADMIN. CODE tit. 15, § 23.113.
192. Cf. 20 C.F.R. § 416.621 (2015) (giving some preference under the SSA to
representatives “demonstrating strong concern for beneficiary’s well being” in
case of minor recipients as well as to those with custody).
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income conception of children’s Dividends, and the heightened level of
parental responsibility it entails, avoids the self-undermining
shortcomings of the present approach, better advancing the program’s
aims. In short, a child’s Dividend can and should be construed as the
recipient’s rightful income.
Even under current proposals to modify the program in the face of
Alaska’s recent fiscal troubles, it happily seems like the Permanent Fund
Dividend is not going anywhere anytime soon. 193 But then neither are its
attendant issues regarding parents and children outlined here. The
tensions between anti-paternalism and the owner state ethic, parental
rights and children’s welfare and legal interests, remain intertwined with
the program itself. When it comes to children and their Dividends, a deep
rethinking of parental duty is still in order.

193. See Jim Carlton, Alaska’s Permanent Fund Loses Its Sacrosanct Status, WALL
ST. J., Apr. 16, 2016, http://www.wsj.com/articles/alaskas-permanent-fundloses-its-sacrosanct-status-1460799000 (reporting on plan to bring payouts closer
to long-term average of approximately $1,100 per year).

